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Session VIII: Patents and Biotechnology
International Aspects of Patent Protec-
tion for Biotechnology t
John Richards*
INTRODUCTION
The British press during the past week or so has been carrying
articles about a speech by Dr. Andrew Lindsey of Mansfield Col-
lege, Oxford. What he said is that in granting a patent for the
"Harvard mouse"-the mouse that is predisposed to cancer and
which is used for testing drugs used in the treatment of human
cancer-the European Patent Office has "achieved the lowest status
granted to animals in the history of European ethics. It shows," he
says, "that we have reached a humanistic dead-end street in which
limits imposed by God are gone. The world is not ours to master
or control; our status should be that of creatures, not of creators."
Now, he's an Oxford man. Much of the basic work in the
biotech industry is done at Cambridge. The "Harvard mouse"
comes from Cambridge, Massachusetts. I don't know if this colors
his approach to the subject, but maybe it does.
t This paper is adapted from a speech presented at the Fordham Conference on Inter-
national Intellectual Property Law and Policy held at Fordham University School of Law
on April 15-16, 1993.
* Partner, Ladas & Parry, New York, N.Y.; Cambridge University, M.A. 1970; Uni-
versity of London, LL.B. 1979.
1. See Onco-mouse/Harvard, Decision of 3 April 1992, [1992] O.J. Eur. Patent Off.
[O.J.E.P.O.] 568 (Examining Div.), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 106, E-
35, acq., Case T 19/90, [1990] O.J.E.P.O. 12/476 (Tech. Bd. App. 1990), reprinted in 5
Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 103, T 19/90-1, rev'g and remanding, Decision of 14 July
1989, [1989] O.J.E.P.O. 11/451 (Examining Div.), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook
(MB), ch. 106, E-17.
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I. BACKGROUND.
A. The New Situation
Biotechnology is one of the world's oldest technologies. As an
example of this fact, people have been brewing beer for thousands
of years; that's a straight biotech process. So why do we now have
a situation where people are getting excited about the patents in
this area?
I think there are two reasons: The first is the fact that in cer-
tain aspects of this technology one is dealing with living materials.
This raises questions that the patent systems in most countries have
not had to deal with before.2 The other is that this is perhaps the
first time that the patent system has been of vital importance in the
early stages of development of a new science, and this in itself
raises a number of problems as to the appropriate scope of protec-
tion given.
B. Development of the Industry
In order to understand the problems, presented to the patent
world in the field of biotech it is worthwhile to look briefly at the
history of the industry as it has developed. The 1970s saw the
introduction of the two major new techniques on which most mod-
em biotechnology was founded, namely recombinant DNA technol-
ogy (genetic engineering) and the introduction of techniques for
producing monoclonal antibodies.
To understand the issues involved, however, we have to start a
little further back. The knowledge that long chain molecules pres-
2. The U.S. Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1988), which might be
regarded as an exception to the statement, is in many respects more of a copyright-type
statute than a patent one. Rights are confined to excluding asexual reproduction of the
plant or its sale or use and the plant is effectively defined in terms of its picture. These
restrictions make the protection close to the copyright principle of protecting against
copying of an expression rather than the patent principle of granting a right to exclude
others from using the new ideas defined in a patent's claims.
3. One might have thought that the computer industry would have given us some
guidance in this area, but, unfortunately, in the early days of computer development the
focus was much more on copyright and trade secret protection then on securing patent
rights. Thus, in the computer industry, patent issues really only emerged at a compara-
tively late stage in the development of the industry.
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ent in cells as part of chromosomes known as deoxyribonucleic
acid contain genetic information goes back to the 1920s. But, it
was not until 1953 that Francis Crick and James Watson-while
working in Cambridge-showed that DNA exists in cells in the
form of a double helix, that is to say, there are two strings of poly-
mer which are complementary to each other. Each strand compris-
es a backbone of phosphate and sugar molecules-deoxyribose
being the sugar-with a base attached to each sugar unit. The
combination of the sugar unit and the base is known as a nucleo-
tide. Only four bases are involved, namely, adenine (A), cytosine
(C), guanine (G), and thymine (T). It was already known that the
total number of adenine molecules present equal the total number
of thymines and the total number of guanines equals the total num-
ber of cytosines.
Crick and Watson in their theory pointed out that in the two
strands of nucleotides forming the double helix, adenine was al-
ways paired with thymine on the opposite strand and guanine with
cytosine. Thus, this meant that each strand could act as a template
for construction of the opposite strand. While this insight provided
the key to understanding how DNA might be replicated during cell
division-the strands become unwound for a while and a new "op-
posite" strand is constructed on the template of a single strand of
the unwound double helix-it did not explain how the DNA form-
ing a gene performed any other function in the body. The answer
to this question was provided in 1956 by Francis Crick in the so-
called central dogma of molecular biology. It is as follows:
Duplicatio NA Transcription RNA Translation Protein
RNA referred to in the central dogma is another polynucleotide
chain. This time, however, the backbone sugar is ribose as op-
posed to deoxyribose as in the case of DNA. Another major differ-
ence between DNA and RNA is that RNA normally exists as a
single strand. In the production of proteins according to the central
19931
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dogma, strands of messenger RNA are formed from the template
of the temporarily decoupled DNA double helix by a process
known as "transcription." This messenger RNA is then acted upon
by a ribosome (a structure contained in the cells which itself con-
tains substantial amounts of RNA) to assemble amino acids present
in the cell to form a polypeptide or protein. This operation is
known as "translation." However, it was not until 1966 that the
code by which particular sequences of nucleotide in DNA led to a
polypeptide containing a particular sequence of amino acids was
worked out. According to this code, groups of three bases on the
DNA determine the location of a single amino acid in the resulting
polypeptide. Since there are sixty-four possible combinations of
three bases (43) and only twenty amino acids used in the production
of polypeptides, it gives rise to interesting possibilities and, in fact,
several different combination of bases may result in the same ami-
no acid in the final polypeptide. In all, sixty-one of the possible
sixty-four combinations define a particular amino acid. The re-
maining three combinations code for stop signals to indicate where
the gene ends.
From 1970 onwards, numerous enzymes called "restriction
enzymes" have been found that cut DNA at points where a specific
combination of bases occurs. The discovery of these enzymes
constituted the gateway to recombinant DNA technology or genetic
engineering. An enzyme was already known that joins pieces of
DNA together. Once restriction enzymes became available for
"precision cutting" of DNA, this permitted one to take a piece of
DNA from one DNA chain and insert it into a different DNA
chain. The first successful attempts at doing this were in San Fran-
cisco and Stanford in 1972. These techniques enabled one to take
a gene from one organism and insert it into the DNA of a different
organism. Thus, for example, DNA's that code for production of
proteins such as insulin, human growth hormone, and tissue plas-
minogen activator have been inserted into bacteria to cause such
bacteria to produce these proteins. Similarly genes leading to a
predisposition to develop cancerous tumors have been introduced
into the embryos of mice so as to produce mice that are susceptible
to tumors for use in cancer research.
[Vol. 4:433
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Research during much of the 1970s and early 1980s was fo-
cused on development of techniques for this purpose. Two key
elements exist in doing this: first, identifying a gene having partic-
ular properties, and second, introducing it into a cell where it can
function to produce significant quantities of the desired protein.
Techniques such as "Southern blotting" (named after its inven-
tor E.M. Southern), a description of which was published in 1975, 4
provided powerful tools to enable researchers to start to identify
which portions of a length of DNA contained a particular series of
bases. This was instrumental in meeting the first requirement.
Work on the second element focused on the means for intro-
ducing "foreign" DNA into a suitable cell. Normally this is done
by incorporating the desired DNA into a vector that can be intro-
duced into the cell. A particularly convenient form of a vector is
a plasmid. Plasmids are relatively small, often circular, pieces of
DNA that are common in many bacteria and some other forms of
cell. Alternative vectors include viruses, bacterial phages, and
other DNA fragments. In particular, much work was done on the
means for controlling when an organism would or would not pro-
duce a desired product. Cells are at all times producing a large
number of proteins. Many of these are enzymes for internal use
within the cell. Others are materials to be secreted into the body
or the environment. Production of particular materials at particular
times is governed within the cell by regulatory regions and signal
sequences on the DNA. These are regions that determine whether
there will be transcription of a particular piece of DNA at any
given time. These sequences may be responsive to the environ-
ment so that, in ways that are still not fully understood, a cell will
only produce a particular product under certain circumstances re-
sponding to an external stimulus. Similarly, since some proteins
are for internal use within a cell only and some are for excretion,
the DNA has to provide coding to indicate to the cell wall that the
protein produced may pass through it and be released into the envi-
ronment. Furthermore, certain proteins are only released into the
4. E.M. Southern, Detection of Specific Sequences Among DNA Fragments Separated
by Gel Electrophonesis, 98 J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 503 (1975).
1993]
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environment after they have been "coated" with sugar molecules.
Early work in this field concentrated on the use of bacteria for
production of such proteins because the lack of a nuclear wall in
procaryote cells such as bacteria was expected to make genetic
engineering easier. However, it soon became clear that for certain
purposes-for example, the coating of the protein with appropriate
sugars-to minimize the differences from human equivalent, cells
of higher organisms (eucaryotes such as yeasts, plants, and ani-
mals) were needed.
In 1985, two major events occurred: (1) the introduction of
gene machines; and (2) the introduction of polymerase chain reac-
tion technology. The first of these are computer-controlled appara-
tus that enable chemical synthesis of long chains of DNA. The
second is a technique for enzymatic reproduction of pieces of DNA
to produce a large number of copies of it. The introduction of
these two techniques has gone a long way towards demythologizing
biotechnology in the eyes of patent examiners and has resulted in
an increasing tendency toward tougher examination worldwide.
The second major strand of biotech practice, relates to antibod-
ies. Here the great step forward was in 1975 when Kohler and
Milstein-also like Watson and Crick, working in Cambridge
-- discovered that by fusing certain types of cells together to pro-
duce something known as a hybridoma, they could cause the result-
ing fused cell to produce a monoclonal antibody, that is, an anti-
body specific to particular function. By 1980, human monoclonal
antibodies were being produced; by 1985, recombinant antibody-
enzyme molecules were being produced; and, in 1989, production
of antibodies in plants was achieved for the first time.
II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
A. UPOV Treaty and the Strasbourg Convention
The first attempt at international harmonization of intellectual
property law .relating to biotechnology occurred in the field of
plants. In 1961, after several years of discussion as to whether
protection for plants could fit comfortably into the patent system,
a separate treaty for the protection of plants was adopted: the
[Vol. 4:433
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International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants ("UPOV Treaty" or "UPOV Convention" or "Treaty").5
Major features of the UPOV Treaty were that it would provide
protection for plants and seeds as long as the plant constituted a
new, stable, and homogeneous variety. Although this protection
could be through the patent system, under the UPOV Treaty, dual
protection by patent and plant variety rights for the same botanical
genus or species was prohibited. In a 1991 revision of the Treaty,
the prohibition on dual protection was abolished. The special na-
ture of "living" material was recognized in the Treaty by requiring
that the rightsholder must remain in a position to produce propagat-
ing material throughout the entire period of protection.
In 1963, the Council of Europe6 created the Convention on the
Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for
Inventions ("Strasbourg Convention").7 The Strasbourg Convention
never has had any real independent existence of its own-it was
only ratified by sufficient number of countries to come into effect
in 1980, after the European Patent Convention8 had come into ef-
fect. Its definition of "patentable subject matter" was adopted by
the drafters of the European Patent Convention and thus provides
the European definition and has proved to be a model in many
other countries throughout the world.
5. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2,
1961, as revised, Geneva, Oct. 23, 1978, 33 U.S.T. 2703 [hereinafter UPOV Treaty]. The
treaty is commonly known as the UPOV Treaty from its initials in French---Convention
Internationale pour la Protection des Obtentions Vegetales.. The UPOV Treaty was
recently amended and opened for signature in Geneva on March 19, 1991, ("Amended
UPOV Treaty") and is awaiting ratification by five states, of which at least three must
have been a party to a prior version of the treaty. Amended UPOV Treaty, Mar. 19,
1991, Geneva, reprinted in 3 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 90.
6. The Council of Europe was established in 1949 to promote co-operation between
European countries in several areas including social and scientific ones. It is a body best
known for its work on the European Convention on Human Rights. Its membership is
different from and it has no formal relationship with the European Community.
7. Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents
for Inventions, Strasbourg, Nov. 27, 1963, Eur. T.S. No. 47, reprinted in 3 Eur. Pat.
Handbook (MB) ch. 92 [hereinafter Strasbourg Convention].
8. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, opened for signature Oct. 5, 1973,
13 I.L.M. 270 [hereinafter European Patent Convention].
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The Strasbourg Convention definition required that an invention
must be new, susceptible of industrial application, and involve an
inventive step.9 It specifically excluded from patent protection
plant and animal varieties and essentially biological processes for
the production of plants and animals.10 During the 1950s, Germany
had, in fact, granted at least one patent relating to a plant variety.
Thus, it was not a foregone conclusion that the Strasbourg Conven-
tion would exclude protection for plant and animal varieties. How-
ever, since the member states of the Council of Europe were essen-
tially those who had been the leading participants in the work lead-
ing up to the adoption of the UPOV Convention and since agricul-
tural interests in Europe were at the time-and in a significant
sense still are-opposed to patent protection for plant varieties, it
is not surprising that the prohibition was adopted. It is of interest
to note, however, that the prohibition did not extend to all living
things; there was a specific exception for microorganisms-the "in-
dustrial" nature of which had long been recognized in the brewing
industry.
Before progressing further in considering the development of
the patent law in this field, it is worthwhile to briefly consider the
essential differences between patent rights and plant variety rights.
Seed registries had started as a private German scheme in 1905,
and after the Second World War they were created as national
bodies by a number of European countries. Typically, these were
under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture. Thus, to a sig-
nificant extent, that were dealt with by a different set of bureau-
crats from those who were involved with intellectual property.
Such vesting of interests was a significant factor in the develop-
ment of rights in this area. Traditional plant variety rights arose as
a result of cross-breeding of varieties-a normal biological means
to produce a new variety having particular characteristics. These
factors led to the adoption of a definition of what was protectable
by a plant variety right in terms rather different from traditional
patent protection. Thus, according to the UPOV Treaty, a plant
9. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 7, art. 1.
10. Id. art. 2.
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variety right extends to a new variety of plant which is "clearly
distinguishable by one or more important characteristics from any
other variety whose existence is a matter of common general
knowledge" at the time of seeking protection." Such characteris-
tics must, however, be susceptible to precise description and recog-
nition. Furthermore, the variety must be sufficiently homogeneous
and stable in its essential characteristics after repeated sexual repro-
duction or vegetative propagation.1 2 On the other hand, no require-
ment exists for describing how the variety is obtained, merely the
giving of a "variety denomination" to act as the generic name for
the variety.' 3 However, the holder of the right had to maintain
itself in a position to supply propagating material of the variety at
least throughout the lifetime of the protected right, which is fifteen
years for plants and eighteen years for certain "slow-growing"
plants such as vines and trees.1 4 Moreover, as long as repeated use
of the variety is not required to produce it, the original rightsholder
has no rights in respect of any new variety that someone else may
create using the protected variety as an initial source.15 Thus, a
plant variety right essentially protects the originator of a variety
from competition by others who have obtained a plant from him
who then go on to grow further "copies" of the plant in question
by normal reproductive techniques, and only accidentally protects
the originator of the variety from competition by others who repro-
duce the hybrid in question themselves, totally, independently from
the work of the plant variety rightsholder. To this extent, the pro-
tection afforded by a plant variety right is perhaps more akin to
that of copyright than to traditional patent protection.
The UPOV Treaty was amended most recently in 1991.16 The
amendments will come into effect when ratified by five countries,
at least three of which must already be members of the Strasbourg
Convention. There are five principle changes:
11. See UPOV Treaty, supra note 5, art. 6(1)(a), 33 U.S.T at 2711.
12. See id. art. 6(1)(c)-(d), 33 U.S.T at 2712.
13. See id. art. 13, 33 U.S.T at 2715.
14. See id. art. 8, 33 U.S.T at 2712.
15. See id. art. 5(1), 33 U.S.T at 2710.
16. See Amended UPOV Treaty, supra note 5.
19931
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One, after a transitional period, member states will have to pro-
vide protection for all genera and species of plants.'7 Under previ-
ous versions of the UPOV Convention, countries could opt to pro-
tect only a limited number of species.
'Two, the definition of what is meant by a "variety" has been
revised and narrowed so that it now reads:
'[V]ariety' means a plant grouping within a single botanical
taxon of the lowest known rank, which grouping, irrespec-
tive of whether the conditions for the grant of a breeder's
right are fully met, can be
-defined by the expression of the characteristics result-
ing from a given genotype or combination of genotypes;
-distinguished from any other plant grouping by the
expression of at least one of the said characteristics and
-considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for
being propagated unchanged. 8
The rightsholder will, however, now be entitled to a royalty or the
products of the harvest obtained from the growth of plants deriving
from propagating material to which he has rights unless the
rightsholder did in fact have "a reasonable opportunity to exercise
his right in relation to ... the propagating material" itself.19
Three, it will now be possible for countries to provide for dual
patent and plant variety protection.2 °
Four, the duration of protection for most plants is extended to
twenty years, and in the case of vines and trees to twenty-five
years. 2
1
Finally, the definition of infringement of the proprietor's rights
has been amended with respect to propagating material taken from
the protected variety so as to cover not only production, offering
for sale and marketing, but also the act of reproduction.22 This
17. Id. art. 5.
18. Id. art. 1(vi).
19. Id. art. 14(2).
20. Id. art. 32.
21. Id. art. 19(2).
22. Id. art. 14(1).
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then raises questions as to the position of farmers who grow crops
largely for production of their seeds, such as those who grow grain.
The revised version of the Treaty gives member states the right to
address the problem by restricting breeder's rights "in order to
permit farmers to use for propagating purposes, on their own hold-
ing, the product of the harvest which they have obtained by plant-
ing on their own holdings. 23
B. The European Patent Convention
Returning now to European development of the law in this area,
as noted above, the definition of patentable inventions set out in the
Strasbourg Convention was in large measure adopted by the Euro-
pean Patent Convention24 which was signed in 1973 and came into
effect in 1978 with the opening of the European Patent Office
("EPO") in Munich.
Article 53(b) of the European Patent Convention provides that
patents shall not be granted for "plant or animal varieties or essen-
tially biological process for the production of plants or animals."
The Article goes on to state that "[t]his provision does not apply
to microbiological processes or the products thereof."25
The European Patent Convention has two other patentability
bars that relate to biotech. First, Article 53(a) bars the grant of
patents for inventions whose publication or exploitation would be
contrary to ordre public (public policy) or morality, provided that
the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely be-
cause it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the
Contracting States.26 Second, Article 52 effectively bars the grant
of patents for methods of treatments of humans or animals by sur-
gery or therapy and also of diagnostic methods practiced on a hu-
man or animal body.27
Article 53(b) provides an interesting sidelight on the signifi-
cance of the interpretation given to the European Patent Convention
23. Id. art. 15(2).
24. European Patent Convention, supra note 8.
25. Id. art. 53(b), 13 I.L.M. at 286.
26. Id. art. 53(a), 13 I.L.M. at 286.
27. Id. art. 52, 13 I.L.M. at 285.
1993]
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by the EPO. The Austrian Patent Office Board of Appeals, in a
case that was based on Austrian national law, opined that the word-
ing in the European Patent Convention barring grants of patents for
"plant or animal varieties" extended to microorganisms, notwith-
standing the fact that the Convention specifically states that "micro-
biological process or the products thereof' are not covered by the
bar. It took the view that it was impossible to draw a dividing line
between plants and animals on the one hand and microorganisms
on the other.28
This view was different from that taken by the European Patent
Office in its original guidelines ("EPO Guidelines"), which stated
that "microorganisms themselves ... when produced by a microbi-
ological process" were patentable.29 In 1981, the EPO Guidelines
were expanded to make it clear that propagation of a microorgan-
ism was a microbiological process and so the product of such a
propagation (i.e., the microorganism itself) was in principle capable
of protection. The only exclusion on protection for microorganisms
was when what was sought to be claimed was a discovery rather
than an invention, i.e., the microorganism is itself found in nature
and is being claimed in such a way that the natural material falls
within the scope of the claim. 30
Following a modest international outcry at the decision of the
Austrian Patent Office, the Austrian Parliament promptly passed
legislation bringing Austrian practice into line with that of the
EPO.31
1. Patent Protection of Higher Life Forms
On the question of protection for higher life forms, the Examin-
ing Division of the EPO ("Examining Division") at first rejected
claims to the so-called "Harvard mouse." This was a mouse partic-
ularly susceptible to cancer and thus a valuable research tool, and
28. Judgment of Mar. 7, 1985, Austrian Patent Board of Appeals, Case B52/84,
translated in [1986] O.J.E.P.O. 4/109.
29. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN
PATENT OFFICE, ch. IV, pt. C, para. 3.5-3.6 (1992) [hereinafter EPO GUIDELINES].
30. Id. ch. IV, pt. C, para. 3.5.
31. Law of June 17, 1986, Bundesgesetzblatt fOr die Republick Osterreich (Aus.),
translated in [1987] O.J.E.P.O. 133.
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the subject matter of the first animal patent granted in the United
States.32 The ground was that claim was to a new animal variety.33
In view of the way the case was decided and the loose way in
which the case has been discussed, it is important to note that the
main claim was not in fact directed to a mouse but covered all
non-human trans-genetic mammals whose germ cells and somatic
cells contained a specified gene.34 The Examining Division con-
cluded that the Strasbourg Convention-from which the EPO's
prohibition on patenting of animal variety derived-had no con-
templation of granting patents on any type of animal, and conse-
quently the relevant provisions could not be interpreted to provide
for such protection now. However, it determined that no issues of
public policy or morality arose from the application.35
On appeal the EPO Board of Technical Appeals ("Appeals
Board") decided that the Examining Division had not properly
considered the meaning of the term "animal variety" in the prohibi-
tion.36 This could not simply be equated with "animals" since the
linguistics of the various equally authentic tests in three languages
did not permit such an interpretation. In particular, the word used
in the German text of the European Patent Convention-tierarten
-clearly indicated that a specialized meaning had to be given to
the term. Thus, on remand further consideration of what was meant
was necessary. In addition, the Examining Division was directed
to reconsider the evidence on the question of whether the grant of
patents for animals might be contrary to ordre public or morality.37
32. See U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866, 1089 OFFICIAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. 703 (Apr. 12,
1988).
33. Onco-mouse/Harvard, Decision of 14 July 1989, [1989] O.J.E.P.O. 11/451 (Ex-
amining Div.), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 106, E-17, E-19.
34. Id. at E-18.
35. Id. at E-30 to -33.
36. Onco-mouse/Harvard, Case T 19/90, [1990] O.J.E.P.O. 12/476 (Tech. Bd. App.
1990), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 103, T 19/90-1.
37. Id. at T 19/90-12. An interesting jurisprudential issue on the question of inter-
pretation of the European Patent Convention was touched upon in the Appeals Board's
decision when it expressed the view that "the purpose of a law (i.e., the ratio legis) is not
merely a matter of the actual intention of the draftsmen [legislators] at the time when the
law was adopted, but also of their presumed intention in light of changes in circumstances
which have taken place subsequently." Id. at T 19/90-9.
1993]
446 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
After such reconsideration, the Examining Division issued a
decision to grant a patent for the invention. 8 The Examiners noted
that the claims were not directed to any particular sub-species of
animal (in fact the claims covered all genetically modified non-
human animals into which the appropriate genes had been intro-
duced) and so concluded that what was claimed could not be con-
sidered to be an animal "variety. ' 39
On the question of the ordre public or morality, the Examining
Division believed that a balancing test was appropriate in every
case depending on the invention in question, with three factors
needing to be considered in the present case: (1) the interest of
mankind in providing remedies for dangerous diseases; (2) protec-
tion against uncontrolled dissemination of unwanted genes; and (3)
prevention of cruelty to animals.40 Since, in the instant case, the
invention opened the way to needing fewer animals for experimen-
tation and the invention could be practiced in a way such as to
avoid widespread dissemination of genes, the Examining Division
concluded that the advantage of providing a tool for use in the
fight against cancer outweighed the possible negative factors and
thus the invention was patentable.41
The "Harvard mouse" decision has been much criticized in
Europe and the patent is subject to multiple oppositions on the
ground that the grant was, in fact, contrary to the EPO's decision
and in breach of the European Patent Convention's prohibition of
the grant of patents on subjects that were contrary to ordre public
or morality. The grant of the patent also attracted the passage of
a critical non-binding resolution by the European Parliament ("Par-
liament").
Since the grant of the "Harvard mouse" patent, the EPO has
reported that it has rejected a patent application42 on morality
38. Onco-mouse/Harvard, Decision of 3 April 1992, [1992] O.J.E.P.O. 568 (Exam-
ining Div.), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 106, E-35, E-36 (grant of Euro-
pean Patent No. 0 169 672).
39. Id. at E-37.
40. Id. at E-38.
41. Id. at E-28.
42. Parliament Calls for EPO's Withdrawal of Onco Mouse Patent, 7 World Intell.
[Vol. 4:433
PATENTS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
grounds, although no decision yet seems to have been published.
In this application, the modified mouse was particularly adapted to
use in the testing of cosmetics. It seems that the benefit to society
was not perceived as being sufficient to overcome possible cruelty
to the animal.
For the time being, the EPO seems to be slowing down action
on further animal cases until a decision is reached on the opposi-
tions in the "Harvard mouse" case. The issue remains a hotone
and is at the core of the delays that have occurred in adopting the
European Community's Proposed Directive on biotechnology in-
ventions ("Proposed Directive").43
In Hybrid Plants/Lubrizol, a prior case before the Appeals
Board, no such issue of morality seemed to arise on the question
of the patentability of claims to a process for rapidly developing
hybrids and commercially producing hybrid seeds, to hybrid seeds
themselves, and to phenotypically uniform plants obtained from
such seeds.44 The relevant questions were simply whether these
were claims to "plant varieties" or "an essentially biological pro-
cess for the production of plants. 45 Although the steps recited in
the process claim were only crossing and cloning steps, it was held
that due to the special sequence in which these steps were to be
taken, the process ceased to be "essentially biological" and so was
patentable.
In Hybrid Plants/Lubrizol, the Appeals Board observed:
[I]nstead of the traditional approach of creating a single
new crossing first and trying to propagate the individual
result afterwards, the specific arrangement of the steps as
presented ... provide a process with a reversed sequence:
it multiples the parent plants by cloning and then crosses
the cloned, and thus derived, parent lines on a large scale
Prop. Rep. (BNA) 91 (1993).
43. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions, O.J. C 10/3 (1989) [hereinafter Proposed Directive].
44. See Hybrid Plants/Lubrizol, Case T-320/87, [1990] O.J.E.P.O. 3/71 (Tech. Bd.
App. 1988), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 103, T 320/87-1.
45. id. at T 320/87-6.
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repeatedly to provide the desired resulting hybrid popula-
tion. This arrangement of steps is decisive for the invention
and permits the desired control of the special result in spite
of the fact that at least one of the parents is heterozygous.
The facts of the present case under appeal clearly indicate
that the claimed processes for the preparation of hybrid
plants represent an essential modification of known biologi-
cal and classical breeders processes, and the efficiency and
high yield associated with the product in the present case
show important technological character. 4 6
As far as the plant per se claims were concerned, the Appeals
Board first had to determine what was meant by the term "variety."
It found that is had no generally accepted meaning but noted that
the restriction in the definition of patentable subject matter had
"been adopted in part to prevent overlap between the protection
provided by patents and the provided by plant breeder's rights
laws." 47 The Appeals Board went on to observe that hybrids such
as those claimed were not protectable by plant variety rights so that
no possibility of double protection arose. 48 It decided that a "vari-
ety" meant a "multiplicity of plants which are largely the same in
their characteristics and remain the same within specific tolerances
after every propagation on every propagation cycle." 49 The Ap-
peals Board concluded that because plants obtained by the present
invention were derived from a heterozygous patent they lacked
sufficient stability to be a variety and thus did not fall within the
prohibition on protection of "plant varieties." 50
Although the question of morality had not been considered
during the prosecution of the Hybrid Plants/Lubrizol application,
a number of groups have filed oppositions to the patent alleging
that the grant was contrary to the morality provision of the Europe-
an Patent Convention. The oppositions are still pending.
46. Id.
47. Id.





2. Patent Protection for Lower Life Forms
So far as protection for lower forms of life is concerned, the
EPO Guidelines for examination make a number of points on the
question of patentability of microbiological inventions. Since these
guidelines are for the most part the result of hard-crafted compro-
mises between various national positions, they should perhaps be
accorded more weight than might otherwise be the case.
The EPO Guidelines state that a "microorganism can be pro-
tected per se if it is a product obtained by a microbiological pro-
cess. The term microorganism covers plasmids and viruses also."5
Therefore, it is clear that per se protection can be obtained for
products of genetic engineering. Mutation techniques probably also
count as "microbiological processes" for the purpose of the provi-
sion, although in this case there may be problems in connection
with reproductibility of the invention. In dealing with the question
of sufficiency, the EPO Guidelines make an oblique reference to
this problem indicating that there may be a "fundamental insuffi-
ciency" in a specification if "the successful performance of the
invention is dependent on chance. ' 5 2 They cite microbiological
processes involving mutations as an example of such a category.
Difficulty also arises in the case of microorganisms which oc-
cur naturally and are isolated from their natural environment. "Dis-
coveries" are unpatentable under Article 52(2)(a) of the European
Patent Convention. A similar provision is found in the law of
those countries that adopted the "European" definition of what is
patentable. Unfortunately, the EPO Guidelines avoid the specific
issue of whether isolation of a naturally occurring microorganism
is merely a discovery rather than an invention. The EPO Guide-
lines do, however, say with respect to substances in general that "if
the substance can be properly characterized either by its structure,
by the process by which it is obtained or by other parameters and
it is 'new' in the absolute sense of having no previously recognized
existence then the substance per se may be patentable. An example
of such a case is that of a new substance which is discovered as
51. EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 29, ch. IV, pt. C, para. 3.5.
52. Id. ch. IV, pt. C, para. 3.5.
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being produced by a microorganism."53
In practice, the Examining Division seems to be allowing
claims to isolates of naturally occurring microorganisms if there is
anything inventive in the isolation process or if the phenotype, as
obtained by isolation, differs in some way from that as found in
nature. The same principles apply for example to new plasmids
obtained from naturally occurring microorganisms. So far, howev-
er, there has been no Appeals Board decision on these issues.
The position taken on the question of the need for
reproductibility adopted by the European Patent Office is that the
EPO accepts that the deposit of an organism in a culture collection
from which it can be obtained meets the requirements for
reproductibility of the invention.54 The EPO's view seems to be
followed in most countries that have harmonized their law with the
European Patent Convention.
A somewhat related issue is the question of how to define cer-
tain biotech products. This is perhaps most acute in the field of
long-chain DNA or RNA fragments where it may be extremely
tedious to determine the exact sequence of nucleotides present.
The EPO will often permit restriction maps to be used for this
purpose. Such maps are maps of a piece of DNA indicating the
locations at which certain enzymes will cut the chain. Frequently
these are coupled with statements that other specified enzymes
have no effect on the chain at all. Thus, such maps provide a type
of "fingerprint" for the fragment in some ways analogous to the
fingerprint provided by an infra-red spectrum in traditional organic
chemistry.
An interesting issue on the degree of specificity required for
such maps arose in the case of Ajinomoto/Composite Plasm id. In
this case, the Opposition Division of the EPO ("Opposition Divi-
sion") had rejected an opposition wherein it had been alleged that
a claimed plasmid was anticipated on the basis of a prior disclosure
on the ground that the opponents had not shown the DNA sequence
53. Id. ch. IV, pt. C, para. 2.1.
54. Id. ch. IV, pt. C, para. 3.6.
55. Case T-109/92, [1992] EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 163.
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of the claimed plasmid to be identical with that of the prior refer-
ence. The Appeals Board reversed this decision and remanded the
case to the Opposition Division for further consideration. The
Board felt that a conclusion of identity between the two plasmids
could be drawn on the basis of the facts that the restriction maps
were very similar as was the list of enzymes that did not cut the
DNA at all. However, it felt that, in view of the incorrect ap-
proach taken by the Opposition Division, the patentees should have
a further opportunity to show that there was in fact a difference
between the plasmids.
Similar problems exist in connection with definitions of
monoclonal antibodies. They are illustrated by two decisions relat-
ing to different patents of Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation, both
of which were revoked by the Appeals Board after oppositions had
been filed.56 Both patents claimed mouse monoclonal antibodies
defined in functional terms as reacting with one type of cell but not
reacting with other types of cells and claimed a hybridoma said to
produce such antibodies. This hybridoma was defined solely by a
culture collection deposit number. The Board noted that, while
functional definitions were often appropriate to define inventions
that could not readily be defined in any other way, this should not
mean that an undue burden could be put on one seeking to know
the ambit of the claims. The Board's view was that "[i]f the de'
scription of the invention leaves the skilled person in doubt, so that
he cannot carry out the invention by applying his skill and a rea-
sonable amount of experiment, then the disclosure is not suffi-
cient. '5 1
In these cases it was found that to determine which attributes
would meet the criteria of the claims "means a huge amount of
effort and, above all, it is not certain that (a suitable) hybridoma
can be selected at all.",58 The patentees had argued that their de-
posit and description of a particular hybridoma meant that they had
56. Monoclonal Antibody/Ortho, Case T-418/89, [1993] O.J.E.P.O. 20 and Case T-
495/89, [1992] EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 48.
57. Monoclonal Antibody/Ortho, Case T-418/89, [1993] O.J.E.P.O. 20.
58. Id. at 27.
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given a description of how to produce one embodiment of the in-
vention and this was all that was required. Unfortunately for the
patentee, it was shown by the opponents that the hybridoma in
question in fact produced antibodies that at least to some extent
reacted with cells with which the claims required that they did not
act. Thus, the argument failed on factual grounds. The Board was
not required to decide how broad a claim was appropriate based on
a single culture collection deposit.
The fact that the deposited hybridoma did not produce antibod-
ies as described in the specifications further meant that the deposit-
ed hybridomes could not be regarded as being examples of "the
invention." As such, claims to the hybridomas themselves also had
to be revoked.59
C. National Laws
1. Higher Life Forms
Probably the first country to try to come to grips legislatively
with the problems of patentability of plants or animals was, some-
what surprisingly, Hungary. The Hungarian Patent Law of 196960
contained a number of specific provisions on these topics. Thus,
Article 6(2) provided that: "Plant varieties and animal breeds and
the process for obtaining them shall be patentable if the variety or
breed is new, homogenous, and relatively stable."
The Hungarian law also dealt with the vexing question of exact-
ly what type of monopoly should be granted for such plants or
animals given their self-replicating abilities that do not exist for
other types of inventions. The law provided that the patentee's
exclusive rights were confined to "the sexual or asexual propagat-
ing material" of the plant variety or animal breed. However, the
law did also provide specifically that export of the propagating
material to other countries where similar protection did not exist
was subject to the grant of permission by the patentee.61
59. Id. at 32.
60. Patent Law of 1969, art. 6(2) (Hung.).
61. Id. arts. 68, 71. The Hungarian law was amended in 1984 to comply with the
UPOV Treaty. See Patents Laws of 1969-1983 (Hung.). As amended, all provisions
relating to patents for plants and animals are grouped in Part III of the law. The new
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Only a little later-and no less bold-was Mongolia, whose
patent law specifically states that "new and improved breeds of
farm animals and poultry and new varieties of agricultural plants
and other flora" are patentable, even if they were created "by selec-
tion. ' 61
Other countries have been slower to deal with the issues, possi-
bly because of the morality issue that has come to the fore in the
EPO. Many countries have specific provisions barring the grant of
patents for inventions whose publication or exploitation would be
contrary to morality. These include: Austria,63 Bahamas, 64 Bel-
gium, 65 Brazil, 6 Chile,67 the Czech Republic, 68 Denmark,69 Fin-
land,7° France,7 Germany, 72 Honduras, 73 Hungary,74 Italy,75 Japan,76
Article 67 reads: "A plant variety is patentable if it is distinguishable, novel, homoge-
neous and stable and if it has been given a variety denomination apt for registration." As
amended, the rights granted by such a patent are also the same as those set out in UPOV
Treaty.
62. Patent Law of 1970, art. 21 (Mong.).
63. See Patent Law of 1990, § 2(1) (Aus.). Section 2(2) bars the grant of patents on
plant and animal varieties.
64. See Patent Law of 1965, § 9 (Bah.). Section 9 bars the grant of patents for
plants or animal varieties.
65. See Patent Law of 1984, § 4(2) (Belg.). Section 4(1) bars the grant of patents
for animal varieties and some plant varieties.
66. See Patent Law of 1971, § 9(a) (Braz.). Section 9(a) bars the grant of patents
on inventions "the purposes of which are contrary to ... morality ... to religious cults
or to sentiments that are worthy of respect and veneration." There are no specific provi-
sions relating to plants or animals.
67. See Patent Law of 1991, § 38 (Chile). Section 37 bars the grant of patents to
plant or animal varieties.
68. See Patent Law of 1990, § 4(a) (Czech.). Section 4(a) bars the grant of patents
for inventions that are contrary to the "principles of humanity or morality." Section 4(c)
bars the grant of patents for plant or animal varieties.
69. See Patent Laws of 1967-1989, § 1(4) (Den.). Section 1(4) bars the grant of
patents for plant or animal varieties.
70. See Patent Laws of 1967-1985, § 1(4) (Fin.). Section 1(4) bars the grant of
patents for plant or animal varieties.
71. See Intellectual Property Code of July 1, 1992 (Fr.). L 611-17b bars the grant
of patents for some plant varieties. L 611-17c bars the grant of patents for animal variet-
ies.
72. See Patent Law of 1980, § 2(1) (F.R.G.). Section 2(2) bars the grant of patents
for animal and some plant varieties.
73. See Patent Laws of 1919-1976, art. 6 III (Hond.). There are no specific provi-
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Korea,77 Norway,78 Romania,79 Russia, ° Saudi Arabia,81 Spain, 2
Sweden,83 Switzerland, 4 and the United Kingdom.85 Furthermore,
Decision 313 of the Andean Pact, which provides the basis for the
patent laws of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela contains a
similar provision.8 6 In Japan, the definition of a patentable inven-
tion is that it involves use "of a law of nature in the highly ad-
vanced creation of technical ideas. 87
In 1975, the Japanese Patent Office published Standards for the
sions relating to plants or animals.
74. See Patent Laws of 1969-1983, § 6(3)(b) (Hung.).
75. See Patent Laws of 1939-1987, § 13 (Italy). Section 13 bars the grant of patents
for animal varieties.
76. See Patent Laws 1959-1987, § 32(3) (Japan). There are no specific provisions
relating to plants or animals.
77. See Patent Law of 1990, § 32 (Korea). Section 31 specifically provides for
patent protection for a "new and distinct variety of a plant" which reproduces itself
asexually. There are no specific provisions on other types of plants or for animals.
78. See Patent Laws of 1967-1980, § 1(4) (Nor.). Section 1(4) bars the grant of
patents for plant or animal varieties.
79. See Patent Law of 1991, § 12 (Rom.). It should be noted, however, that Section
11 specifically provides protection for stable plants and animal breeds, thereby preempting
any argument on the application of moral principles to these two issues.
80. See Patent Law of 1992, art. 5(3) (Rus.). Article 5 bars the grant of patents for
inventions that are "contrary to the public interest or to the principles of humanity and
morality." This section also bars the grant of patents for "agricultural crops and breeds
of animals."
81. See Patent Law of 1988, § 8 (Saudi Arabia). Section 8 bars the grant of patents
on inventions that are contrary to the Shari'a.
82. See Patent Law of 1986, § 5(1) (Spain). Section 5(1) bars the grant of patents
on animal varieties and some plant varieties.
83. See Patent Laws of 1967-1983, § 1(4) (Swed.). Section 1(4) bars the grant of
patents on plant and animal varieties.
84. See Patent Law of 1976, § 2 (Switz.). Section l(a) bars the grant of patents on
plant varieties and animal breeds.
85. See Patent Act of 1977, § 1(3). The British statute is a little different from most
of the others in that Section 1(3) bars the grant of patents only if publication or exploita-
tion of the invention "would be generally expected to encourage offensive, immoral, or
anti-social behavior." The same section bars the grant of patents for "any variety of
animal or plant."
86. Industrial Property Law, Andean Pact Cartagena Agreement, Decision 313, art.
7(a), reprinted in OFFICIAL GAz. EXTRAORDINARY 4451 (Aug. 5, 1992). The position in
Bolivia, which is also a pact member, is less clear.
87. Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 2(1) (Japan).
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Examination of New Plant Varieties ("Examination Standards").88
According to the Examination Standards, such inventions include
inventions of bred varieties per se and inventions of processes of
producing the plants of such bred varieties. Such plants, however,
had to be able to maintain a sufficient degree of homogeneity and
perpetuity to enable this to be applicable for an industrial purpose.
To be patentable, under the Examination Standards the new plants
had to be morphologically or physiologically different from the
prior plants as a result of differences in their genes.
One or two patents for plants as such seem to have been issued
with these guidelines. However, Japan also has an Agricultural
Seeds and Seedlings Law89 dating back to 1947 which was revised
in 1982 to become more similar to the U.S. Plant Variety Protec-
tion Act of 1970.90 Under the Japanese law, protection may be
granted to those who bred stable new plant varieties. The adminis-
tration of this is under the auspices of the Japanese Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries.
Unfortunately, a jurisdictional dispute developed between the
Japanese Patent Office and the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture
and Fisheries. The resolution of the dispute resulted in a de facto
situation in which the Patent Office refrains from granting patents
for plants per se and confines itself to the granting of patents on
processes for developing new plants. Under Japanese law, the
direct product of a process claim is an infringement of that claim.
However, uncertainty exists as to whether natural reproduction of
a plant that was itself produced by a patented process can be re-
garded as infringement of that process.
Since the basis of the demarcation lines drawn between the
different Japanese agencies seems to have been based on the old
UPOV Convention rule against double protection by patent and
plant variety rights, and this distinction has been removed in the
88. Law No. 115 of October 2, 1947 (Japan).
89. Law No. 71 of 1982 (Japan).
90. Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-574, § 1,
94 Stat. 3350 (1980) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992)).
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most recent revision to the UPOV Convention, it is to be hoped
that the question of "who does what" may be revisited in the near
future and patent protection for plants more fully established. So
far as animal patents are concerned, the Japanese Patent Office still
apparently takes the view that the grant of such patents would be
contrary to the "morality" provisions of the Patent Law. It may be
hoped that a liberal construction of a similar provision in Europe
may lead to reconsideration of this position as a result of talks on
harmonization between the "big three" patent offices.
Problems as to the patentability of hybrid plants arose in Cana-
da in the case of Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd. v. Commissioner,9 1 which
was heard by the Canadian Supreme Court in 1989. Patentability
was actually rejected on the grounds that the application had not
contained sufficient disclosure as to the nature of the invention.
Questions of sufficiency will be considered later in this paper. Of
interest to the present point, however, is the Supreme Court's com-
ments as to whether there was in principle any objection to patent-
ability of a new soybean variety. The case had originally been
rejected by the Canadian Patent Office on the ground that plant
varieties did not fall within the definition of "invention" contained
in the Canadian Patent Act.92 An invention was defined as "any
new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter or any new or useful improvement in any art, process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter."93 The statute
also contains a provision rejecting patentability for "any mere sci-
entific principle or abstract theorem."'94
Unfortunately, the Canadian Supreme Court, having set the
scene, ducked the issues. It noted that there are two distinct types
of genetic engineering: (1) traditional crossing of plants leading to
hybrids; and (2) manipulation of genes by "artificial intervention."
The court noted that traditional breeding methods had not been
regarded as patentable. The Court stated:
91. 60 D.L.R.4th 223 (1989).
92. Id. at 225-26.
93. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 2 (1985) (Can.).
94. Id. § 27(3).
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Hi-Bred is asking this court to reverse a position long de-
fended in the case-law. To do this we would have, inter
alia, to consider whether there is a conclusive difference as
regards patentability between the first and second types of
genetic engineering, or whether distinctions should be made
based on the first type of engineering, in view of the nature
of the intervention. The court would then have to rule on
the patentability of such an invention for the first time. The
record contains no scientific testimony dealing with the
distinction resulting from use of one engineering method
rather than another or the possibility of making distinctions
based on one or other method.95
The court went on to note that this issue is a complex one and,
since the case could be decided on the question of adequacy of
disclosure, it did not reach any decision on the basis of the basic
issue."
Interestingly, in amending the relevant portions of their statutes,
while harmonizing much of the rest of their law to the European
Patent Convention and generally following the format used in other
countries, Belgium,97 France,98 Germany, 99 and Spain 0 specifically
provided for patent protection of microbiology inventions. They
also provided protection for any plant varieties for which protection
was not available under their individual plant protection laws. The
Italian law contains no prohibitions on patents for plant varieties at
all. However, the laws of most of the other member states of the
European Patent Convention follow the Convention wording on this
point.
In Mexico, vegetable "varieties" are patentable.1 °1 On the other
hand, vegetable "species," animal "species," or their varieties, and,
essentially, biological processes for the obtention or reproduction
95. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 60 D.L.R.4th at 231 (1989).
96. Id. at 238.
97. See Patent Law of 1984, § 4(1) (Belg.).
98. See Patent Law of 1990, § 7(b) (Fr.).
99. See Patent Act of 1980, § 2 (F.R.G.).
100. See Patent Law of 1986, § 5()(b) (Spain).
101. Patent Law of 1991, art. 20 (Mex.).
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of plants, animal species or their varieties are not patentable. Since
these features were new in the 1991 law, it remains to be seen how
the examiners and courts will treat the division between certain
plant claims and other plant and animal claims. However, it seems
experienced claims and the EPO in this area affected the drafting
of the law and may also affect its interpretation.
Patents are granted for novel plants in Korea,1 2 and there are
theoretical grounds for believing that novel animals should be pat-
entable also but no such patent seems to have been issued yet. In
Australia and New Zealand, the law provides that a patent shall be
granted for a "manner of new manufacture" 1 03 -a term that first
appeared in the English Statute of Monopolies in 1624.14 As the
term has been interpreted by the court, it seems that in principle
both plants and animals may be patented, although as yet there do
not seem to be any specific decisions on point.10 5 On the other
hand, the new Russian law maintains a bar on the patentability of
"agricultural crops and breeds of animals."' 6 Nor, contrary to
expectations, does the latest amendment of the Chinese law permit
patents of plants as such.0 7
2. Patentability of Other Biotech Products
Patentability of lower life forms has been less difficult. Most
countries, in facing the question of what is to be patentable in this
field, have applied the law as it has developed in the chemical arts
analogously to biotechnology. The application of these principles
has, however, not been entirely straightforward since there has been
a tendency not to grant patents for living matter. The first supreme
102. See Patent Act of 1961-1990, art. 31 (Korea).
103. Patent Act of 1990, sched. I (Austl.); Patent Act of 1953, § 2 (N.Z.).
104. An Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws and the
Forfeitures Thereof, Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. ch. 3, (623-24) (Eng.).
105. By way of caution, however, it should be noted that although the statute makes
no reference to questions of morality, it does provide that patents shall not be granted if
such grant would be "mischievous to the state" or "generally inconvenient"; in New
Zealand the courts have reused to grant patents for medical treatments based in part on
these provisions.
106. Patent Law of Russian Federation of Oct. 7, 1992, art. 5(3).
107. Patent Law of 1985, art. 25 (P.R.C.). However, "processes for producing"
animal and plant varieties are patentable.
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court to be forced to grasp this nettle was that of the Federal Re-
public of Germany which, in 1975, was confronted with claims re-
lating to baker's yeast. l" In its official headnote to its decision,
the Court stated: "Product protection for a new microorganism is
allowable if the invention shows a reproducible way to produce the
new microorganism."' '
The Court noted that "organisms existing in nature should re-
main available to everybody" and that protection is "also excluded
for those microorganisms that are produced by a non-reproducible,
induced mutation or a non-reproducible hybridization."' 10 Howev-
er, it has long been established in West German law that patents
can be granted for inventions concerning hitherto unknown forms
or isolations of natural substances. In 1977, in the Antanamide
case,"' the Court went further and upheld a per se claim to a cyclic
decapeptide, antanamide, that had been extracted from amanite
fungus on the ground that this product was new, since no one had
suspected its prior existence so that it had never previously been
available to the public. There seems to be no reason why this
principle should not apply to an isolate of previously unknown
microorganisms, even though it pre-existed in nature. In 1980, in
In re Microlife Technics Inc., 112 the Court held that mere deposit of
a microorganism with a culture collection without disclosure of a
repeatable method for its manufacture does not justify the granting
of patent protection for the microorganism per se since disclosure
of a means of repeating the, invention was an essential consider-
ation for a patent. In the Antanamide case, the reproducibility
requirement had been met by describing a synthesis of the new
compound. This expedient may not be readily available for new
microorganisms. However, this decision was overruled by the
108. Judgment of Mar. 11, 1975, (Baekerhefe/Baker's Yeast), Bundesgerichtshof
(BGH) (F.R.G.), reprinted in 6 I.I.C. 207 (1975).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Judgment of July 18, 1977, Bundespatentgericht (BPatG) (F.R.G.), reprinted in
10 I.I.C. 494 (1979).
112. Judgment of December 11, 1980, 12 Entscheindungen des Bundesgerichtshofes
in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 862 (F.R.G.), translated in 12 I.I.C. 862 (1981),.
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decision in the Rabies Virus case in 1987, where it was held that
in the interests of European harmonization, the provision of the
European Patent Convention relating to the case of deposit of mi-
croorganisms to meet the requirements of the law, having regard to
sufficiency of disclosure, should apply in Germany also. 113
The Japanese Patent Office issued specific guidelines on inven-
tions relating to microorganisms in 1979.14 Revised guidelines for
applied microbiology, including appendices on microorganisms and
genetic engineering were issued in 1984. The guidelines accept the
patentability of microorganisms as such and provide that in the
case of a microorganism that has been isolated from nature the
claim "must include the phrase isolated in a substantially pure
form." Furthermore, they require that the claim specify the nature
of the novelty of the claimed organism, although this may be ac-
complished by reciting a difference in properties of the new micro-
organism, for example, a claim to "bacillus subtilis having no spo-
rogenic ability." In cases where a naturally occurring microorgan-
ism is claimed that has been obtained by routine screening, howev-
er, it may be difficult to persuade the Japanese Patent office that an
inventive step forward has been made so that the invention is non-
obvious.
In Australia, the Patent Office held, in In re Ranks Hovis
McDougall1 15 that mere isolation by an unspecified method of
something that occurs in nature is unpatentable. The decision did,
however, acknowledge the patentability of a "new microorganism
which has improved or altered useful properties" which is obtained
"by some man-controlled microbiological process.""11
6
113. Judgment of Feb. 12, 1987, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] (F.R.G.), reprinted in 5
Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 121, 121/11, 121/16.
114. See JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION OF INVENTIONS
OF MICROORGANISMS, ch. 1, para. 3 (1979) (Japan). The guidelines define microorgan-
isms as yeasts, molds, mushrooms, bacteria, actinomycetes, algae, viruses, protozoa and
the like and for convenience culture tissues of animals and plants.
115. In re Ranks Hovis McDougall Ltd., 46 A.O.J.P. 3915 (1976) (Austl.), reprinted




In Canada, the Commissioner in In re Abitibi' 7 allowed claims
to a novel mixture of fungi-some of which were novel-which
had been caused to become acclimatized to spent sulfite liquors.
It commented, however, that "the organism claimed should not, of
course, have existed previously in nature for in that event the 'in-
ventor' did create it and the 'invention' is old.""' 8 These dicta are
in line with an earlier Canadian Patent Office decision in In re
086556'19 to the effect that claims to a novel human liver cell line
resulting from an unexpected chance mutation were unpatentable
on the ground that the cell line was already in existence through
fortuitous circumstances before the applicant did anything that
could be considered inventive. Method of use claims based on the
unexpected utility of the cell line were patentable. The Appeals
Board decision, approved by the Commissioner in Abitibi, stated
that the rationale of that decision also applied for "all microorgan-
isms, yeasts, molds, fungi, bacteria, actinomycetes, unicellular al-
gae, cell lines, viruses or protozoa, in fact, all new life forms which
are produced en masse as chemical compounds are prepared."'' 20
Statutory changes in the laws in Korea,' 2 1 Mexico, 22 and Rus-
sia123 have also now permitted the grant of patents relating to mi-
croorganisms. Serious problems as to the patentability of microor-
ganisms or indeed, any living organisms still exist, however, in a
number of countries. For example, the Indian Patent Office has
recently issued a circular stating that inventions relating to "living
material"-defined as including even DNA strands them-
selves-were not patentable. Such reasoning exists-at least in
case of product per se claims-in Taiwan where even claims to
117. 62 C.P.R.2d 81 (Bd. App. 1982).
118. Id. at 91.
119. 35 C.P.R. 2d 56 (Bd. App. 1975).
120. See In re Abitibi, 62 C.P.R.2d at 81.
121. Patent Law of 1961-1990, art. 4 (Korea).
122. Patent Law of 1991, art. 20 (Mex.). The Mexican statute contains no general
provision relating to morality, possibly because of the need to emphasize the secular
nature of the State. However, the statute seeks to fill in some of the blanks arising from
this omission by specifically barring the grant of patents for genetic material and living
matter comprising the human body.
123. Patent Law of 1992, art. 5(2) (R.S.F.S.R.).
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recombinant vectors are currently refused.124 Furthermore, several
countries, most notoriously Argentina and Taiwan, require full
sequence data for DNA fragments that are to be patented.
D. Novelty and Inventive Step
In addition to the questions of whether biotechnological inven-
tions comply with the requirements for statutory subject matter for
protection, such inventions must also meet the additional require-
ments of novelty and non-obviousness. Such issues have only been
considered by a few courts outside the United States; most of these
are in Europe. It is probably most convenient to start first With the
European Patent Office's view.
The first case to come before the EPO Appeals Board was
Biogen's patent application for alpha interferons. 125 The patent was
opposed by nine different opponents. The main claim read as fol-
lows:
A recombinant DNA molecule for use in cloning a DNA
sequence in bacteria, yeasts or animals cells, said recombi-
nant DNA molecule comprising a DNA sequence selected
from:






said DNA inserts being exemplified, but not limited to,
the DNA inserts of the recombinant DNA molecules
carried by the microorganisms identified by accession
numbers DSM 1699-1703, respectively,
(b) DNA sequences which hybridize to any of the fore-
124. Patent Law of 1944, § 4 (Taiwan). The law specifically bars the grant of
patents for microorganisms.
125. Biogen/Recombinant DNA, Decision T-301/87, [1989] O.J.E.P.O. 11 (Tech. Bd.
App. 1989), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 103, T 301/87-1.
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going DNA inserts and which code for a polypeptide of
the IFN-a type, and
(c) DNA sequences which are degenerate as result of
the genetic code to the DNA sequences and inserts de-
fined in (a) and (b) and which code for a polypeptide of
the IFN-oc type.126
Certain features of this claim are worth noting before proceed-
ing further. First, the list of "clearly defined" DNA inserts, group
(a), are defined in terms of plasmids from which they are available.
Second, the group (b) DNA fragments are defined in a functional
manner, specifying that they hybridize with-i.e., have a sequence
of bases that is complementary to-the fragments mentioned in
group (a) and which have a particular function, namely that will
code for alpha interferon (polypeptides). Third, the group (c) is
defined as being the functional equivalents of (a) and (b) but limit-
ed to those wherein certain specific nucleotides have been replaced
by other nucleotides which are known, as a result of the degenera-
cy of the genetic code, to result in the same amino acid in the final
protein. It has been previously noted that there are only twenty
amino acids that are used in polypeptide production, but there are
sixty-four possible combinations of three bases, so that certain
different three base combinations code for the same amino acid.
This is what is know as the "degeneracy of the genetic code."
The claims were attacked on three main grounds: (1) they were
unclear in such references to "hybridization" and "degeneracy"; (2)
they gave insufficient specification information to allow the inven-
tion to be repeated; and (3) they lacked novelty over the contents
of certain "gene banks" that existed previously.
It was also argued that in any case the claim was defined too
broadly having regard for the limited disclosure given as to how it
should be carried out. This objection was dealt with very succinct-
ly by the Board which pointed out that prior case law held that the
sufficiency requirement was satisfied if at least one way was clear-
126. Id. at T 301/87-2.
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ly indicated enabling a skilled person to carry out the invention. 127
On the second issue noted above regarding insufficient informa-
tion, the Board disposed of the issue very succinctly:
There is no necessity to provide instructions in advance
how each and every member of [a] class would have to be
prepared . . . . [V]ariations in the construction within a
class of genetic precursors, such as recombinant DNA mol-
ecules claimed by a combination of structural limitations
and functional tests, are immaterial to the sufficiency of the
disclosure, provided that the skilled person could reliably
obtain some members of the class without necessarily
knowing in advance which member would thereby be made
available.1 21
In the techniques employed there was no guarantee that the
same product could be obtained, even by carrying out identical
steps. Nevertheless, if the steps taken would necessarily result in
one member of the class being obtained, even if it was not the
same as the member that was obtained on the previous operation,
this would suffice. As the Board noted, it is the nature of process-
es starting from natural sources and aiming at genes coding for
polypeptides that individual variations might inevitably occur. In
the present case, by defining the products in terms of their hybrid-
ization ability and the type of polypeptide that was to be produced,
sufficient definition had been imparted to insure that they knew
what fell within the scope of the claim.
The final major ground of objection was that the claims lacked
novelty. Of course, there previously existed a cloned library of
large, random, embryonic human DNA fragments, the so-called
Lawn Gene Bank which was available to the public. The DNA
contained in this bank would apparently hybridize with the DNA
inserts mentioned in the main claim, and code for an alpha interfer-
on-type polypeptide. The patentees' arguments that their claims
were novel notwithstanding the existence of this bank were basical-
127. Id. at T 301/87-11.
128. Id. at T 301/87-1.
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ly that the bank contained no index as to which DNA fragments
had which properties. Thus, the Board concluded that the DNA
sequences claimed the first claim had not therefore "been made
available" to the public in any meaningful way.1 29
Furthermore, it appeared that the nature of the basis for the
preparation of the Lawn's Gene Bank (human liver) would not
have been a source for one looking for DNA likely to be useful in
production of interferon. Additionally, appropriate probes for test-
ing whether the DNA in the Lawn's Gene Bank would hybridize
were not readily available. Thus it was held that the existence of
the gene bank did not destroy the novelty of the claim. The Board
responded:
As a matter of general interest, it can be stated that even if
some fragments of the collection were to have all the re-
quired properties, the availability of such material without
undue burden had not been established. The fact that such
phages are hidden in a random collection of 240,000 un-
identified individual samples is not irrelevant to the issue.1 30
The Board did not agree with the opponent's submissions that
the situation was the same as that where there was incidental refer-
ence to a prior disclosure in an unindexed book in a library. The
Board commented:
The interrogation of a library material, is at least for some
members of the public, a direct mental procedure. The col-
lection in the present case must be interrogated by physical
inter-actions, and a consequent biochemical process in each
case. Although any vial containing the relevant phage is a
separate entity, it is impossible to get to the vial without
working through tens of thousands of samples. The circum-
stances are such as if the material were under lock and
where the key has to be first manufactured and applied.1 31
If anything, according to the Board:
129. Id. at T 301/87-12.
130. Id. at T 301/87-13.
131. Id.
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the situation resembles that prevailing with natural sub-
stances ... and is rather like the isolation of a component
or bacterium from soil where the same exists in admixture
with other useless materials. Thus, the idea that the gene
bank itself would once for all anticipate an invention relat-
ing to a nucleotide sequence which may be contained there-
in somewhere, cannot be sustained. 32
The question of clarity of claims also came up in the case of
Hoechst/Plasmid pSG2.133 In this case, the Appeals Board stated
that in order for a claim to a plasmid to be properly characterized,
it required details not only of its source microorganism and contour
length, but also of its restriction map. In this case, the examining
division had rejected claims directed to a plasmid found in a partic-
ular strain of streptomyces as being obvious since in its view one
would expect to find plasmids in streptomyces. In addition, the
applicants had not shown their plasmid to have any advantag-
es-such as a shuttle vector--over another plasmid obtained from
a different streptomyces strain. On appeal, the claim was allowed
since the Appeal Board found that the presence of plasmids in
streptomyces strains was rare and that to find one in a strain of a
technically useful species of streptomyces provided a useful and
inventive step forward in the art.
In the case of Polypeptide Expression/Genen tech,'34 the Appeals
Board considered the obviousness issues that arise in connection
with recombinant DNA technology and also the question of how
broadly it was appropriate to claim inventions in the field. In this
case, the claim was directed to a recombinant plasmid suitable for
transformation of a bacterial host wherein the plasmid comprised
a homologous regulon, (i.e., DNA normally present in the cell in
question that controls the transcription of a gene) a heterologous
DNA (i.e., DNA alien to the bacterium in question) that encodes
for a functional polypeptide, and one or more termination codons.
132. Id.
133. Decision T 162/86, [1988] O.J.E.P.O. 12/452 (Tech. Bd. App. 1987), reprint-
ed in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 103, T 162/86-1.
134. Decision T 292/85, [1989] O.J.E.P.O. 7/275 (Tech. Bd. App. 1988), reprint-
ed in 4 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 103, T 292/85-1.
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The claim was extremely broad, essentially covering any plasmid
that claims a homologous regulatory region together with alien
DNA coding for a protein. The Examination Division had argued
that the claim should be limited at least to known bacteria,
plasmids, and polypeptides.135 It also indicated that it objected to
the idea that components could be defined in functional terms in
this area of technology since this could result in claims of extreme
breadth. 3 6
In Polypeptide, the relevant prior art involved work which
showed that insertion of heterologous regulons and heterologous
polypeptide-coding DNA into a bacteria had not succeeded in pro-
ducing useful polypeptides. It also included an article that had sug-
gested that extensive translation of functional heterologous
polypeptides might occur if one could simply ensure that in tran-
scribing the DNA the right groups of three nucleotides were read
together. Thus, in the view of the Examining Division, what the
applicants had done was really nothing more than define an obvi-
ous problem more precisely rather than provide the solution to it. 137
The EPO Appeals Board first dealt with the issue of the suit-
ability of functional language in the claims, noting that in other
areas of technology such language had been approved "if such
features cannot otherwise be defined more precisely without re-
stricting the scope of the invention.' 38 It went on to state that
"there was no valid reason why this should not be equally true for
the field of biotechnology as in other fields of technology."' 139 The
Board could see no particular reason why the terms "plasmids" or
"bacteria" should be restricted to known plasmids or bacteria any-
more than in other areas of technology the -term "resilient means"
or "amplifying means" should be restricted to known expedients. 40
Insofar as the question of obviousness is concerned, the Board
noted that although the prior art clearly showed that the objective
135. Id. at T 292/85-2.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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obtained by the present invention was a desirable one, prior art had
never suggested that a way to do this was to couple a heterologous
coding region with a homologous regulon. This, coupled with the
fact that, once the invention was disclosed it was immediately used
made it clear that an inventive step existed. The Board recognized
that it was granted a very broad claim and concluded its opinion as
follows:
The Board of Appeal recognizes the inventive step and
broad applicability of the plasmids claimed in the present
application. This necessitated the careful assessment of the
scope of the subject matter claimed in order to give a fair
protection to the proprietor. Unless the features of the
claim are construed as proper in embracing present and
future uses of the invention, and in fact all conceivable uses
of the inventive idea, the patent system would fail to serve
its purpose. 141
Here, therefore, the Appeals Board sees no problem in granting
broad protection to a new technique with extremely wide applica-
bility in the recombinant genetic field.
The EPO Appeals Board's liberal approach contrasts starkly
with the results achieved on another Genentech patent in the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal in the famous Wellcome-Genentech tissue
plasminogen activator (t-PA) case. 42 There, the main claim read,
"recombinant tissue plasminogen activator essentially free from
other proteins of human origin."'143 This case has caused an enor-
mous fuss. There are three extremely long decisions by the Eng-
lish Court of Appeals, all of which concluded that the claims were
unpatentable, and all of which gave totally different reasons as to
why they were unpatentable.
I think the case really has to be viewed on its facts as much as
141. Id. at T 292/85-16.
142. In re Genentech Inc.'s Patent, 1989 REP. PAT. DESIGN AND TRADEMARK
CASES [R.P.C.] 147 (Eng. C.A.). In this case, Wellcome Foundation Ltd. had peti-
tioned for revocation of Genentech's patent on tissue plasminogen activator immedi-




anything else. Before the application was filed it was known to be
desirable to produce tissue plasminogen activator, which is a chem-
ical which breaks down blood clots. It was known that recombi-
nant DNA technology had been used to produce other useful chem-
icals which were somewhat similar but not quite as complicated.
It was also known that a particular human melanoma cell line
would secrete natural tissue plasminogen activator. An article had
discussed this and made the suggestion that one possibility for
achieving large-scale production at relatively low cost was the
insertion of an extrinsic plasminogen activator gene into an expres-
sion plasmid of E. coli. The article stated: "As a first step in this
direction, we had isolated the RNA for extrinsic plasminogen acti-
vator in an active form on those melanoma cells."
I think that this case really goes to show that we've got to be
careful about not drafting claims too broadly. The English Court
of Appeal basically said, yes, Genentech had done something useful
in establishing that sequence of the DNA required, but that claim
should not just attempt to cover all of what was a desideratum that
obviously one wanted to achieve and which there is no reason why
those skilled in the art would doubt that they could achieve. So be
careful about the wording of your claims.
This case has been cited by some as being the basis for saying
that all sorts of different things might not be patentable, including
cures for cancer. I don't think that analysis stands up at all. As
I say, I think it really is, at the end of the day, a fairly fact-specific
case. It's very difficult to extract any common rationale out of the
three judgments.
Where you've got a cure for cancer, some have said that this
would not be patentable because you have just evolved routine
technology. That's not really the case. If you discover that a par-
ticular gene will do something which will cure cancer, then, as
long as the fact that that gene will cure cancer has not been pub-
lished somewhere before, incorporating that into a plasmid and then
producing something from that is, in my view, quite clearly patent-
able.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that the European Pat-
ent Office issued a different patent to Genentech, on different
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claims from those which were under opposition in the United King-
dom. This involved a tissue plasminogen activator, as encoded by
the DNA product obtained from RNA, extracted from a melanoma
cell line and having a specific restriction. So that in this case
you've got protection for something which is really quite similar
to what was rejected by the United Kingdom, but, because it was
not couched in such broad, all-encompassing terms, the thing went
through and I have no doubt that it will stand up.
I was asked to say something briefly on the question of the
European position on infringement of process claims, whether im-
portation into a European country of a product produced by a pat-
ented process elsewhere would be an infringement.
Article 64(2) of the European Patent Convention gives protec-
tion to the direct product of a patented process.' 4 However, this
Article does not address the issue which has become a very live
one here recently: what happens if you have a patented organism
in the United States that is used overseas to produce something and
then the product of that production is brought into Europe.
There is no direct product in this case if all you have is a claim
to the organism. Therefore, you should make sure that your Euro-
pean applications claims go not only to the organism itself but also
to their use in producing whatever it is that is of interest to you.
E. The European Community's Proposed Directive on Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions
Clearly the question of patentability of animals has brought the
questions of patent protection more fully into the area of public
debate than is normally the case. This is exemplified by the prob-
lems that the European Community has faced in attempting to
adopt a Directive on patentability in this area.
The Directive was first proposed in 1988 as a response by the
Commission of the European Communities ("Commission") to a
perception that research in the biotech area in Europe was lagging
behind that of the United States and Japan. The Proposed Direc-
144. European Patent Convention, supra note 8, art. 64(2).
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tive was published by the Commission in 1988. 41 1
The Proposed Directive was subject to intensive discussion by
Parliament when it was first submitted. This discussion delayed
progress interminably and the draft was finally given the necessary
initial consideration by Parliament in October 1992.146 In doing so
Parliament suggested many amendments.t 47 These were duly con-
sidered by the Commission which then produced a revised draft
last December.14 8  This draft was to be considered by the Council
on April 15 and 16.4
As originally proposed, the Proposed Directive, in order to
avoid barriers on trade between Member States resulting from dif-
145. Proposed Directive, supra note 43. This Directive was proposed by the
Commission under its powers under Article 100a of the Treaty of Rome, which is one
of the provisions added by the Single European Act. Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958),, amended by Single
European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [198712 C.M.L.R. 741. The Commission has pro-
ceeded under the so-called "cooperation" procedure with the'European Parliament.
Under the European Community's legislative procedures, adoption of legislation
of this type under the cooperation procedure, which was introduced as part of the 1992
program for completion of the internal market, requires that legislation is first pro-
posed by the Commission. *It is then submitted to Parliament for a first reading and
then reconsidered by the Commission to see whether amendments are required in the
light of Parliament's proposal. The draft is then referred to the Council of Ministers
for it to adopt a "common position." It is then returned to Parliament for a second
reading. Only after this is the legislation actually adopted by the Council of Ministers.
The vote required for adoption depends upon whether Parliament and the Commission
agree with what is before the Council. If they do, then a qualified majority in the
Council will suffice. If they do not then the Council can adopt the legislation only by
acting unanimously. [Eds. note: On November 1, 1993, the Maastricht Treaty came
into force. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719. Its "co-decision" procedure will replace the cooperation procedure and
be used after the "common position" is adopted by the Council.]
146. On October 29, 1992 the European Parliament voted to approve the Pro-
posed Directive, subject to its various amendments and, therefore, completed the first
reading of the Parliament under the cooperation procedure. Legislative Resolution No.
A3-0286/92, O.J. C 305/173 (1992).
147. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection for Biotechnologi-
cal Inventions, O.J. C 305/160 (1992) [hereinafter Parliament Amendments].
148. Amended Proposal for Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotech-
nological Inventions, O.J. C 44/36 (1993) [hereinafter Amended Proposal].
149. [Eds. note: The date the proposal is going to be considered has since been
changed to December 16, 1993, and a common position is expected.]
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ferences in legal protection for biological inventions in the various
Member States, would have required that Member States amend
their patent law to provide that the subject matter of an invention
shall not be considered unpatentable only because the subject mat-
ter relates to "living" matter. The initial draft set out the require-
ment that a process which requires human intervention consisting
in more than merely selecting an available biological material and
letting it perform in its inherent biological function under natural
conditions should potentially be considered patentable subject mat-
ter. It also made clear that simply because something existed in a
mixed form in nature, does not mean it is inherently unpatentable.
The Proposed Directive did, however, exclude from protection the
types of plant varieties that are protectable under plant variety act
legislation. It will be recalled that the UPOV Treaty requires
Member States to preclude double protection by patenting and plant
variety rights.1 5°
The Proposed Directive, in addition to stating that subject mat-
ter of this type must be patentable also, however, set out certain
limitations on the scope of protection that should be granted. Per-
haps, the most important of these is in respect of the rights that are
to be granted in cases where a patented process relates to the pro-
duction of living matter or matter containing genetic information
such as, for example, a strand of DNA. In this case, one must
consider whether the progeny of the living organism produced by
the process or, for example, bacteria that result from replication of
a cell into which the DNA material produced by the patented pro-
cess has been inserted are to be considered infringements of the
patent claim. It will be recalled that in general, European law
provides that the direct product of a patented process is an infringe-
ment of that patented process. The question here is whether natu-
rally resulting replicas of that direct product are also infringements.
The original draft Directive prescribed that such replicas will be
regarded as being direct products.
As noted above, the Proposed Directive was severely mauled
by Parliament. Among Parliament's proposed amendments were
150. UPOV Treaty, supra note 5, art. 2, 33 U.S.T. at 2704.
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the following: (1) that a prohibition on patents for the human body
or "parts" thereof (it was not clear whether an isolated gene would
be regarded as a "part" under the prohibition);1 5' and (2) that an
elaboration on the question of what was contrary to ordre public or
morality so as to prohibit patents for "unnatural processes for the
production and modification of animals or [which] cause unneces-
sary suffering or unnecessary physical harm to the animals con-
cerned."' 152
Industry was aghast at these amendments and made representa-
tions to the Commission. The latest version, produced by the
Commission in December 1992 and currently under consideration
by the Council, attempts to meet some of the problems.
53
In rewording the draft, the Commission seems much more
aware than it was initially that as a practical matter it has to have
a reasonably good fit with both the European Patent Convention
and the, as yet inoperative, Community Patent Convention. As
now proposed by the Commission, the draft follows Parliament's
proposal, the main features of the Directive would be as follows:
First, a provision that something should not be unpatentable simply
because it uses or is applied to "self-replicating living matter" or
"any matter capable of being replicated through a biological system
or by any indirect means."'' 54 The first half of the latter provision
clearly covers genetic material. However, what the second half
means is open to question and does not seem to be explained in the
Commission's explanatory memorandum or the recitation of the
draft. More significantly, however, the redraft picks up the Euro-
pean Patent Convention's prohibition on the grant of patents on
inventions whose publication or exploitation would be contrary to
public policy or morality. Furthermore, it sets out certain specific
examples of what is to be regarded as being unpatentable as fol-
lows:
(a) the human body or parts of the human body per se;
151. Parliament Amendments, supra note 147, amend. 15.
152. Id. amend. 18.
153. Amended Proposal, supra note 148.
154. Id. art. 2(1)-(3).
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(b) processes for modifying the genetic identity of the hu-
man body for a non-therapeutic purpose which is con-
trary to the dignity of man;
(c) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals
which are likely to inflict suffering or physical handi-
caps upon them without any benefit to man or animal. 155
The explanatory memorandum comments that so far as (a) is
concerned, the "per se" wording shows that it is not intended to
exclude from patentability "parts" that have been severed from the
body, such as human cell line or a process of producing a human
antibody. In a shot at the U.S. National Institute of Health's pro-
posal to patent gene fragments, however, the explanatory commen-
tary states:
It goes without saying that, if the applicant simply wishes
to patent a mere part of the "human body" per se, e.g., a
human gene, neither the function of which nor the protein
for which it codes is known, exclusion from patentability
would apply.156
So far as the second element in the list of unpatentable subject
matter is concerned, the Commission states that its purpose is "to
leave open the possibility of granting legal protection to inventions
capable of improving considerably the lot of certain human being
suffering from deep-seated illness." 57 However, this provision
must be read in conjunction with a later provision in the draft that
restates the European Patent Convention's prohibition on the grant
of patents for methods of treatment of the human body "by surgery
or therapy" but which provides that products "for use" in such
methods are patentable.
This provision has caused problems in the pharmaceutical area
in the past, but by various acts of sophistry the EPO has found
itself able to allow claims along the lines "compound X for thera-
155. Id. art. 2(3)(a)-(c).
156. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotech-





peutic use" or "for treatment of disease Y" in the case of a first
medical use and "use of compound X for preparing a medicament
for treatment of disease Z." in respect of subsequent medical uses,
even though the only novelty involved was the fact that X could be
used to treat Y or Z. Apparently the Commission envisage such
claims in the biotech area and possibly for useful human genes as
long as the treatment involved is not one for a "non-therapeutic
purpose which is contrary to the dignity of man," although possibly
this will need to be reworded in non-sexist language before being
adopted.
The third group of inventions that the draft would not specify
as being unpatentable is concerned-a topic that was subject to
heated debate in Parliament-and the Commission has not adopted
all of Parliament's proposals in this area. The Commission points
out that ethical issues relating to research in this area are dealt with
in other legislation such as the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Vertebrate Animals used for Experimental and Other
Scientific Purposes. 158 Thus, attempting to regulate such activities
by the patent law would be out of place. On the other hand, some
consideration to animal rights must be made. Hence, the compro-
mise wording is broadly in agreement with the Examining Division
views in the "Harvard mouse" case discussed previously.159
In other provisions of the draft that acts to provide a gloss on
the wording of the European Patent Convention, the draft seeks to
clarify what is meant by the term "essentially biological process."
It will be recalled that the EPO itself bars patents for such process-
es. The proposed wording reads as follows: "In determining
whether this exclusion applies, human intervention and its impact
on the result achieved shall be taken into account. A process
which, taken as a whole, does not exist in nature and is more than
a mere production process shall be patentable."' 6° Again this seems
158. Mar. 18, 1986, Strasbourg; see also Council Directive of 24 November 1986
on the Approximation of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the
Member States Regarding the Protection of Animals Used for Experimental and Other
Scientific Purposes, 86/609/EEC, O.J. L 358/1 (1986).
159. See supra notes 1, 32-41 and accompanying text.
160. Amended Proposal, supra note 148, art. 6.
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broadly in line with the EPO's decision in the Hybrid Plants/
Lubrizol case. 161 Finally, in the area of defining patentable subject
matter, the draft seeks to remove the possibility of rejection of an
application for lack of novelty simply because what is claimed
formed part of an existing material. This again seems to be codifi-
cation of the EPO's decision in the Biogen case.' 62
Chapter II of the draft defines the rights arising from patents in
this area and addresses the difficult question of whether a patent
should cover progeny of something produced by a patentable pro-
cess. The basic scheme is that protection extends "to biological
material directly obtained using that process and to any other bio-
logical material derived from such biological material through mul-
tiplication or propagation and possessing the same characteris-
tics. '
163
However, this general right is subject to a number of limitations
as follows:
(1) an exhaustion of rights if the products in question
derived from biological material marketed by the
patent holder or with his consent for the purpose of
multiplication or propagation,' 64
(2) rights of farmers to use seeds resulting from cultiva-
tion of crops "on their own farms" for sowing at a
later time' 65 or for farmers who rear livestock using
livestock protected by a patent "for multiplication
purposes on their own farms to renew their
stock;"" and
(3) provision for the grant of a compulsory royalty-
bearing, non-exclusive license under patent for those
who hold a plant variety right that is dominated by
161. Hybrid Plants/Lubrizol, Case T-320/87, [1990] O.J.E.P.O. 3/71 (Tech. Bd.
App. 1988), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 103, T 320/87-1.
162. Biogen/Recombinant DNA, Decision T-301/87, [1989] O.J.E.P.O. 11 (Tech.
Bd. App. 1989), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 103, T 301/87-1.
163. Amended Proposal, supra note 148, art. 10(2).
164. Id. art. 11.
165. Id. art. 13(1).
166. Id. art. 13(2).
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a patent and vice versa if this is in the public inter-
est. 
67
The Commission comments that it is skeptical about the need
for farmer's rights, but in view of the extremely strong views ex-
pressed by Parliament on the subject, it "has finally accepted it to
allow the Council to discuss it as part of a continuing cooperation
procedure." The Commission notes that:
the fact that the vast majority of Parliament's members are
in favour of introducing farmer's privilege into patent law
is a political sign which the Commission cannot ignore in
the context of a cooperation procedure. This is all the more
true as the lack of a solution to the problem would prevent
work from continuing on the proposal for a Directive as a
whole despite its having been before the Council and Par-
liament since the beginning of 1989. By accepting farmer's
privilege, the Commission is seeking first and foremost to
unblock the cooperation procedure so as to enable the
Council to state its position on the proposal as amended in
the light of Parliament's amendment and to examine Parlia-
ment's reasons168
It remains to be seen what view the Council will take.
One further point to note on this topic is the fact that the Com-
munity Patent Convention also contains some provisions relating
to limitations on a patent right. The most significant of these is in
respect of "acts done for experimental purposes relating to the
subject matter of the patented invention."' 6 9 Of course the Commu-
nity Patent Convention may never come into effect 170 and if it does,
it may be of interest to only a few inventors if the costs are too
high. However, similar provisions exist in several national laws. 7 '
167. Id. art. 14(1).
168. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 156.
169. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 15, 1975,
Luxembourg, art. 27(b), O.J. L 17/1 (1976).
170. The Community Patent Convention will only come.into effect on ratification
of all the Member States of the European Community. See id. arts. 94, 98.
171. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Code (Law 92-597 of July 1, 1992) L613-5(b)
(Fr.); see Patent Act of 1968, as revised Dec. 16, 1980, art. 11(2) (F.R.G.); see Patent Act
19931
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On the question of deposit requirements, the draft would make
mandatory deposit in a Budapest-Treaty-recognized International
Depository172 before filing of the patent application if the biological
material used or to which the patent relates is "not available to the
public" and "cannot be described in the patent application in such
a manner as to enable the invention to be carried out by a person
skilled in the art."' 17 3 The draft requires that such deposit material
must be available at least to independent experts from the stage of
earliest publication of the patent application and to everybody after
the grant of the patent. However, any such person who obtains a
sample must give an undertaking: "(a) not to make it or any mat-
ter derived therefrom available to third parties, and (b) not to use
it or any matter derived therefrom in any country except for experi-
mental purposes." 174 Furthermore, if the patent application is re-
fused or withdrawn or the patent revoked or cancelled, the deposi-
tor of the sample may request that access to the deposited material
be restricted to independent experts for a period of twenty years
from filing the application and that such experts be required to give
undertakings as discussed above.
The final substantive provisions of the draft go to question of
burden of proof. In this case, the current version of the draft has
been changed from the original proposal so as to bring it more
closely into conformity with the Community Patent Convention.
The revised wording is as follows: "If the subject-matter of a
patent is a process for obtaining a new product, any identical prod-
uct produced by any person other than the patent holder shall, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been ob-
tained by means of the patented process."'' 75 The original wording
on this point was to reverse the burden of proof in such cases in
obtaining both "new" and "known" products.
Act of 1977, § 60(i)(b) (U.K.).
172. See Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Mi-
croorganisms for the Purpose of Patent Procedure, Apr. 28, 1977, art. 3, 32 U.S.T.
1242.
173. Amended Proposal, supra note 148, art. 15(1).
174. Id. art. 15(3).
175. Id. art. 17(1).
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As noted above, once the Council has adopted a common posi-
tion on the draft, it then goes back to Parliament for a second read-
ing. If the Council appears to be unanimous in its position, there
is little more that the Parliament can do at this point since a unani-
mous vote of the Council can overcome any opposition by Parlia-
ment. If, however, there is less than unanimity in the Council,
adoption of the Directive by a qualified majority will require that
the text adopted is one with which Parliament agrees. 176 Thus, it
may still be a while before this Directive actually comes into force.
CONCLUSION
As can be seen from the history of the Proposed Directive, the
"morality" debate has probably not yet been concluded in Europe
and even when it is, there is no certainty that the same conclusions
will be reached in other countries having totally different cultural
backgrounds. However, as noted previously, prohibitions on the
grant of patents on inventions whose publication or exploitation
would be immoral, exist in many countries' patent laws in addition
to the European Patent Convention. The introduction of moral
issues into what has traditionally been a particularly rational part
of the law is itself fraught with problems. Insofar as such issues
are incorporated into the law, it seems generally desirable that this
should be effected by clear actions by the appropriate legislatures.
However, such bodies are notoriously slow at addressing such is-
sues for fear of offending part of the electorate. This seems to be
the reason why the European Community's draft gives examples
only of what is to be unpatentable and none of what may definitely
be patented. And this is from what is said to be the Western
world's legislature that is least beholden to voter pressure!
As we have seen many, but by no means all, advanced coun-
tries see nothing immoral per se in granting exclusive rights for
new life forms, although statutory prohibitions exist in many as to
particular forms and these are unlikely to be amended until the
176. [Eds. note: The common position is now considered under the new co-deci-
sion procedure provided by the Maastricht Treaty. This procedure gives Parliament
more leverage through the new conciliation procedure.]
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morality issue is resolved, since the burden of proof always lies on
the proponents of change. So far as the patentability of animals is
concerned, while one can take the view that patent law as such is
neutral on the question of whether animals should be specifically
created for research or foodstuff purposes, the "antis" argue that the
patent system, by providing an enhanced economic incentive for
the production of such animals, promotes the production of more
animals of this type and so the denial of patent protection would
be useful in the overall fight against such animal experiments.
However, the issue seems to be resolving itself in the same way as
previous disputes relating to the use of animals in research, that is
to say, by means of a balancing test between the benefit to be
brought to mankind or other animals and the suffering inflicted on
the animal. Stating the test, however, is easier than applying it.
Will the benefit given by a more succulent pork chop be sufficient
to justify a patent on a pig that has been genetically modified to
enable it to grow more rapidly under factory farming conditions?
What is even more worrying is that it is likely that patent offices
will have to carry out this test and it is not clear how they are or
will be equipped to perform it.
The second major morality issue, that of the patentability of
inventions relating to the human genome, is even more difficult.
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States 177 and Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights178 both prohibit slavery. Thus it seems that no one could
assert rights over another simply because he or she contains or was
produced with the aid of a patented human gene. What rights,
therefore, are potentially available as patentable subject matter on
parts of the human genome? Those relating to genetic material
itself and use of the gene in question in therapy? This issue is of
course simply a new version of one that has confronted the phar-
maceutical industry for many years. After a prolonged battle, pat-
ent protection for new pharmaceuticals per se is now available in
most major countries of the world. Protection for new methods of
treating disease using an old pharmaceutical is much more prob-
177. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
178. G.A. Res. 217(111), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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lematic. A further moral issue intrudes here, however. There are
two basic ways in which gene therapy may be carried out. The
first is with respect to the somatic cells of a person so as to try to
replace a defective gene in those cells. Except for the techniques
employed and the hoped for permanence of a cure obtained in this
way, the patentability of such techniques raises essentially the same
issues as the patentability of conventional therapies. Namely, the
question of whether a physician or surgeon should be subject to a
patentees rights when carrying out a treatment on a patient. Some
argue that this is no different from the requirement not to prescribe
drugs that infringe a patent; others see it differently. The second
possible type of genetic therapy involves modification of the germ
cells in an embryo, for example, to remove a gene that may predis-
pose the individual to a particular disease. It may also have other
effects on the individual's integrity as a human being. Clearly,
here there is a more significant moral issue. However, again it
seems a little cavalier to leave such issues to the average patent
office examiner.
Coupled with the morality issue are some purely economic ones
such as: Exactly how broadly should protection be granted in the
incipient days of a new industry? More specifically, to what extent
should those who by purely natural means propagate or breed liv-
ing organisms be required to be subject to the patent rights of the
originator of one of the ultimate ancestors of the progeny in ques-
tion, albeit possibly several generations earlier? If such rights are
to exist what form should they take? Is an injunction appropriate
to prevent a bull from doing "what comes naturally" or can we say
that in the state of today's agricultural industry this rarely happens
and so traditional means of relief are appropriate?
A second economic/competition law issue is how is an infant
industry best helped by the patent system? As we saw in the Brit-
ish t-PA case, the English Court of Appeal was skeptical about
granting rights that were too broad in case these rights stifled rather
than promoted invention, As was seen in the Magill cases,180 the
179. See In re Genentech Inc.'s Patent, 1989 R.P.C. 147 (Eng. C.A.).
180. Radio Telefis lireann v. Commission, Case T-69/89, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586
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European courts have on occasion stepped in to order the grant of
licenses where an intellectual property right owner has been using
his rights in such a way as to prevent others from obtaining access
to the basic raw material required to permit competition. Would
the same happen in the biotech area if patentees refuse to grant
licenses to patents covering basic techniques? Probably.
Finally, outside the strictly patent arena, there is a geopolitical
question spawned by the Nairobi Convention on Biological Diversi-
ty signed at last year's so called "Earth Summit" in Rio de Janei-
ro.18' Should commercial enterprises that make a profit for use of
genetic material found in a third-world country pay royalties to that
country for the privilege of using the material?
Clearly this is going to be a stimulating and demanding area in
which to practice for many years to come.
(Ct. First Instance) (Magill TV Guide intervening); British Broadcasting Corp. v. Com-
mission, Case T-70/89, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First Instance) (Magill TV Guide
intervening); Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-76/89,
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 745 (Ct. First Instance).
181. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Convention
on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, Nairobi, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 818 (1992).
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